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WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE
MODERN REGULATORY SYSTEM
MUST THE CONSUMER ALWAYS LOSE?
By MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK*
A.

THE POLIT[CS OF CONSUMERISM

Is modern consumerism simply a fad - just another passing protest
movement of the sixties - or is it a serious social movement here to stay?
A Canadian senator once claimed that consumerism is simply an outlet for
the energies of frustrated women unable to keep their husbands under control.1 An American ad man recently diagnosed it as "a contagious inflammation of the consumer interest portion of the brain often resulting from political
ambition or desire to derive favor from groups of consumers through personal
publicity. Symptoms include a strong tendency to invent issues where no real
issues exist. If not treated severe cases may lead to demagoguery." 2 These
views do not portend a healthy future for the consumer movement; once
the dilettantes and demagogues have found new diversions, the cause will presumably wither unattended on the vine.
A somewhat more positive definition of consumerism might be that
it is a movement which, in an age of bigness and bewildering technological
* Professor, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law; National Vice-President of the
Consumers Association of Canada, 1974-75; Chairman of C.A.C.'s Advocacy Committee,
1973-75. This article was presented as a paper to the annual meeting of the Canadian
Institute of Public Administration in Ottawa in September, 1975.
1 Quoted in J. Ziegel, The Future of CanadianConsumerism (1973), 51 Can. B. R.
191 at 192.
2 Quoted in J.Bishop and H. Hubbard, Let the Seller Beware (Washington: National
Press, 1969) at 10, 11.
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complexity and change, demands for consumers the right to influence significantly economic behaviour in the consumer marketplace - the right of consumers to be sovereign in a marketplace that exists, so classical free-market
theory teaches us, only to serve their needs. So defined, consumerism means a
share of political power and it implies the emergence of a political movement.
For no movement that seeks to change the way things are done can succeed
unless ultimately it can bring effective influence to bear on the political process.
Unfortunately for most politicians in this pluralistic age of interest group
liberalism, decision-making means little more than harmonizing as far as possible the conflicting claims of competing interest groups. As Charles Reich
puts it, in the context of regulatory agencies:
As the agencies have sought a meaning for the public interest they have come
to this: the public interest is served by agency policies which harmonize as many
as possible of the competing interests present in a given situation ....
Thus the
agencies have evolved a meaning for their charters which makes them both
philosopher-kings searching for the good and practical politicians trying to please
a multi-voiced rabble.3

In a heavily regulated society, the doctrine of pluralism envisages competition amongst groups as a self-corrective mechanism analogous to Adam
Smith's "invisible hand" in an unregulated marketplace 4 Unless consumers
as an interest group can find mechanisms for counting themselves in on this
process of political decision-making by competition amongst groups, 5 they are
likely to have minimal impact on the political process or its regulatory arms.
However, some formidable obstacles stand in the way of consumerism sustaining itself as, or developing itself into, a major political force.
1.

Diffusion of the Consumer Interest
Consumer concerns are diffused across the 50,000 or so products and
services that each of us typically consumes in our life-time. An individual
consumer's interest in any one product or service will usually be so small
that it will not be worth his while registering his dissatisfaction with the item
to business, government, or a government's regulatory agencies. At the same
time, business interests concerned with the manufacturing or merchandising
of that product have a sufficiently concentrated stake in any prospective regulation of it to make their views known very forcefully to government.
Professor Milton Friedman, a leading free-market economist, gives a
homely but pointed example of the way the regulatory process acquires a proindustry bias. He takes the case of the ever-escalating occupational licensing
standards set by U.S. barber licensing bodies. The effect of the increasing
rigour of entrance standards, as well as the frequent direct setting of minimum
3 The Law of the Planned Society (1966), 75 Yale L. J. 1227 at 1234; cf. R. V.
Presthus, Elite Accommodation in CanadianPolitics (London: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1973) at 348-49.
4 See T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969) at 71.
5
The important question of whether this is a defensible form of planning, with or
without additional interest group inputs, will be considered later in this article.
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charges, is, of course, to increase the costs to all consumers. Friedman
explains:
The declaration by a large number of different state legislatures that barbers
must be approved by a committee of other barbers is hardly persuasive evidence
that there is in fact a public interest in having such legislation. Surely the explanation is different; it is that a producer group tends to be more concentrated politically than a consumer group. This is an obvious point often made and yet one
whose importance cannot be overstressed. Each of us is a producer and also a
consumer. However, we are much more specialized and devote a much larger
fraction of our attention to our activity as a producer than as a consumer. We
consume literally thousands if not millions of items. The result is that people
in the same trade, like barbers or physicians, all have an intense interest in the
specific problems of this trade and are willing to devote considerable energy to
doing something about them. On the other hand, those of us who use barbers
at all, get barbered infrequently and spend only a minor fraction of our income
in barber shops. Our interest is casual. Hardly any of us are [sic] willing to devote
much time going to the legislature in order to testify against the iniquity of restricting the practice of barbering. The same point holds for tariffs. The groups
that think they have a special interest in particular tariffs are concentrated groups
to whom the issue makes a great deal of difference. The public interest is widely
dispersed. In consequence, in the absence of any general arrangements to offset the
pressure of special interests, producer groups will invariably have a much stronger
influence on legislative action and the powers that be than will the diverse, widely
spread consumer interest.6

Professor Anthony Downs, in his well-known book An Economic Theory

of Democracy,7 provides a powerful analytic rationale for the widely-held
"capture" theory of regulatory agencies, and indeed the political process at

large, by relating the concept of information costs to the intensity of the

interest that a group has in a particular legislative or regulatory issue. It is
worth quoting him at some length:
Clearly, the cost of acquiring information and communicating opinions to government determines the structure of political influence. Only those who can afford
to bear this cost are in a position to be influential.
A striking example of this fact is the failure of consumers-at-large to exercise any
cogent influence over government decisions affecting them. For instance, legislators
are notorious for writing tariff laws which favor a few producers in each field at
the expense of thousands of consumers. On the basis of votes alone, this practice
is hardly compatible with our central hypothesis about government behaviour. But
once we introduce the cost of information, the explanation springs full-armed from
our theory. Each producer can afford to bring great influence to bear upon that
section of the tariff law affecting his product. Conversely, few consumers can bring
any influence to bear upon any parts of the law, since each consumer's interests
are spread over so many products. In fact, most consumers cannot even afford to
find out whether tariffs are raising the price they pay for any given product. Yet
without such knowledge they cannot have policy preferences for the government
to pay attention to.
Under these conditions, government is bound to be more attentive to producers
than consumers when it creates policy. This is true even though (1) government
formulates policy so as to maximize votes and (2) more voting consumers are
affected by any given policy than voting producers. As a result, such devices as
tripartite industrial control boards with representatives from labor, management
and consumers are doomed to failure. The consumer representative never has
effective forces behind him comparable to those of labor and management. Hence
6 Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: Univ. of Chic. Press, 1962) at 143.
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

7
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these boards practically always seize any opportunities for labor and management
jointly to exploit consumers. Even giant labor unions acting for their members'
interests as consumers have to spread their influence across too many products
to be truly effective as counterweights to producers in each field. Economically
speaking, government policy in a democracy almost always exhibits an anticonsumer, pro-producer bias. And this bias in our model exists not because the
various agents concerned are irrational, but because they behave rationally. This
fact has8 tremendous implications for economic predictions in almost every
field...

Illustrations of Downs' analysis are readily found in Canada. On simple,
relatively unimportant, issues such as abnormal bacteria counts in hamburger - "hockey helmet law" as a colleague calls it - the media are easily
able to disseminate the facts, generate public concern, "widen the scope of the
conflict",9 and provoke a governmental response. But on more complex, and
infinitely more important, issues, such as tax reform, competition, food,
energy or housing policy, the information and re-communication costs for
low-intensity groups, like consumers, are too high for them to engage in the
interest group "bargaining" that surrounds each issue.' 0
A particularly striking feature of the views of those who hold that legislative and regulatory decision-making processes are, in the nature of things,
skewed to reflect a pro-producer, anti-consumer bias, is that they come from
all points on the political spectrum from Milton Friedman to Charles Reich,
radically, from massive dealthough the prescriptions for the disease vary
2
regulation" to much greater central planning.'
2.

The Fragmentationof the Consumer Interest
Unlike the position generally with highly concentrated producer interests,

the consumer interest is not homogeneous. Most consumers are also producers,
and as producers we will often see things differently from the way we see them
8 Id. at 255, 256.
For a discussion of the importance of this element in the process of legislative
change, see M. Nadel, The Politics of Consumer Protection (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1971), Chap. 5, and at 243 et seq.
10
The systematic dismemberment of the Carter Commission's proposal for tax
reform in Canada is instructive. Prime Minister Trudeau has been unusually frank in
acknowledging the pressures that overwhelmed the proposals: "... I concede ... that it's
likely we heard more from the vested interests than we did from the little taxpayer who
didn't have.., the high-paid lawyers to speak for him ... I suppose in a participatory
democracy there will always be some whose voice is louder than others.. .". (CTV, Dec.
28, 1971; cited in David Lewis, Louder Voices: The Corporate Welfare Bums (Toronto:
Lewis & Samuel, 1972) at iv.) For recent general studies of interest groups in Canada,
see Presthus, supra, note 3, and Elites in the Policy Process (London: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1974); A. P. Pross, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in CanadianPolitics (Scarborough: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975).
n Apart from the citations already given, see also e.g. G. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation (1971), 2 Bell J. Econ. and Mgmt. Sci. 3; R. Winter, in the
M. Green, R. Nader, R. Winter debates on Economic Regulation v. Competition (1973),
82 Yale L. J. 871-919; R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown,
1972) at 329 et seq.; Engman, Chairman, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Speech to
the Fall Conference of the Financial Analysists Federation, Detroit, Oct. 7, 1974.
12
See e.g. H. Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford: Stanford Univ.
Press, 1961); Lowi, supra, note 4.
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as consumers. If we come from an oil-producing province, we see things differently from consumers from an oil-importing province. If we work on an
automobile production line, we may see questions of public transit, pollution
and safety standards, and lower tariffs on imported cars differently from
other consumers. 18 As environmentalists, we may favour underground wires
but as consumers we may not be prepared to pay the cost. A higher-income
consumer may be prepared to pay $500 for a safer, cleaner car but a lowerincome consumer may not be able to afford the "luxury" of more safety and
less pollution. Even in the case of inflation, role confusion causes problems
for consumers. Whatever the relative contributions of "cost-push" or "demand
pull" to the fact of inflation, consumers in demanding action against inflation
in the first case are fighting their own expectations as wage-earners and in
the second case their own expectations as consumers.
There is also a range of ideological issues pertaining ultimately to
questions of life-style, such as the role and regulation of advertising, rules
governing the availability of credit and product proliferation, and the relationship between expenditures in the private and public sectors about which wide
consensus is unlikely to be forthcoming. The non-materialist ethic upon which
the writings of many critics of the modem consumer marketplace, such as
Galbraith and Packard, are premised is reflected in Packard's dedication to
his book, The Waste-Makers:'4 "To my mother and father who have never
confused the possession of goods with the good life", and his idolizing, in the
same book, of the life-style of an old woman in a lonely New England coastal
cottage, without worldly possessions, who spends her time making greeting
cards out of sea-weed. 5 It is not clear that most consumers share these lifestyle ambitions, or that if they do they would be prepared to see them imposed
on everyone by state fiat, which of course, would call into question the very
nature of our existing social and economic order.
On yet another level, controversies over appropriate government policies
toward the exploitation and allocation of finite resources carry the potential
for deep divisions within consumer ranks over issues of distributive justice.
Proponents of the "limits to growth" philosophy' 0 take the view that the
expansion of the present level of industrial activity, particularly to sustain
burgeoning populations in under-developed nations, will soon exhaust our
depletable resources. Only a modern-day potlatch, a new social ascetism, can
stave off disaster. As Heilbroner points out,' 7 in a "steady-state" economy, the
only way one social class can improve its material position is at the expense
of another social class, in contrast to the pattern of the recent past where all
13 As evidenced by the recent request by the leadership of the United Auto Workers
Union for a moratorium on cost-increasing pollution and safety standards for automobiles until the automobile market returns to buoyancy.
14 (New York: Pocket Books, 1963).
15 See generally, M. Trebilcock, Consumer Protectionin the Affluent Society (1970),
16 McGill L. J. 263.
16 See e.g. D. Meadows et. al., The Limits to Growth (New York: Signet, 1972);
R. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: Norton, 1974).
17 Id.
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social classes have tended to become more affluent by continued economic
growth, while largely retaining their positions relative to one another. If increased affluence for all classes ceases to be a realistic social goal, Heilbroner
predicts greatly exacerbated class divisions and tensions as the focus of public
debate shifts from economic efficiency to economic equity.
The critics of the "limits to growth" thesis 18 rightly point out that these
forecasts of doom largely over-look the function of price as a rationer of
scarce resources. As resources become more scarce and thus more valuable
in the future, their future value is discounted back to appropriately higher
present values which will be sufficiently high to ensure that resources are not
prematurely utilized. Higher present prices will also provide increased incentives to develop alternative technology and resources. This analysis, however,
at best ensures that we may never run out of scarce resources or appropriate
substitutes. But it leaves unresolved the question of economic equity, both as
regards economically disadvantaged social classes domestically, and economically disadvantaged nations internationally, who simply will be squeezed out
of a rationing game governed by price. While ends of economic efficiency may
be served by allowing resources to be bid away to their highest-value use, consumers or consuming nations who cannot bid at all are unlikely to find efficiency an acceptable surrogate for equity. Thus, if it is in fact the case that
the era in North America of ever-increasing affluence for everybody is over,
consumers may find it increasingly difficult to cohere as a single interest
group, marching to a single drum beat, when the question of non-market
distribution of economic output is required to be urgently addressed.
All of these considerations bear on the fragmentation of the consumer
interest and increase the difficulty of achieving a substantial, on-going coalition
of consumer support around basic consumer issues. As organized consumer
lobbies seek, on the one hand, to agree on a set of collective goals, and, on
the other hand, to maximize numerical membership, like major political parties
they will tend to drift to some fuzzy, middle-of-the-road position on the
spectrum of consumers' value preferences, which will tend to confine them to
taking relatively non-controversial positions on issues on an ad hoc basis, and
eschewing any radical, and potentially divisive, critique of fundamental dysfunctions in the system.' 9
3.

The "Free Rider" Problem
Even if a group of concerned consumers concert their efforts in order
to promote their collective interests, the movement will never be as strong
as the number of its potential beneficiaries would imply it should, because
a number of potential contributors of money, time and expertise either need,
or are able, to take a "free ride" at the expense of existing members.
8
1

See e.g. Solow, Notes on 'Doomsday Models' (1972), 69 Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci.
at 3832-33; M. Roberts, "The Limits of the Limits to Growth", in E. W. Erickson and
L. Woverman, eds., The Energy Question (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1972) at
351 et seq.

19 For an analysis of the analogous behaviour of major political parties, see Downs,

supra, note 7.
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In a penetrating economic analysis of the nature of different kinds of
interest groups, Olson draws an analogy between a member of a "latent"
interest group and a seller in a perfectly competitive market:
Some critics may argue that the rational person will, indeed, support a large
organization, like a lobbying organization, that works in his interest, because he
knows that if he does not, others will not do so either, and then the organization
will fail, and he will be without the benefit that the organization could have provided. This argument shows the need for the analogy with the perfectly competitive market. For it would be quite as reasonable to argue that prices will never
fall below the levels a monopoly would have charged in a perfectly competitive
market, because if one firm increased its output, other firms would also, and the
price would fall; but each firm could foresee this, so it would not start a chain
of price-destroying increases in output. In fact, it does not work out this way in a
competitive market; nor in a large organization. When the number of firms involved is large, no one will notice the effect on price if one firm increases its
output, and so no one will change his plans because of it. Similarly, in a large
organization the loss of one dues payer will not noticeably increase the burden
for any other one dues payer, and so a rational person would not believe that if
he were to withdraw from an organization he would drive others to do So.2 0

Olson points out that the nation state, as the extreme example of a large,
latent group, cannot survive on voluntary dues or payments but must resort
to coercive taxes. 21 His central thesis is that unless the number of individuals
in a group is quite small, or unless there is some other special device or incentive to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests. Olson
suggests that, in the absence of coercion, the explanation for membership in
existing large pressure group organizations lies not primarily in the collective
goods these organizations provide to their members but rather in the noncollective goods they provide to members. The pursuit of collective goods, i.e.
common or group interests, is merely a by-product of the provision of noncollective goods.
Applying this analysis to consumer organizations in North America, it is
clear as a matter of both theory and observation that the reason most people
have become members of the Consumers Union in the United States or the
Consumers Association of Canada (C.A.C.) in Canada is the provision of
non-collective rather than collective goods. The associations' magazines, containing product tests etc., are of sufficient value, presumably, to individual
members in each case to justify the expenditure of a membership fee. To the
extent that some of the revenues from memberships are diverted to the pursuit
of collective goods, this is strictly a by-product function. That these byproducts exist at all, applying Olson's central thesis rigorously, seems inconsistent with rational self-interested behaviour by members, and would seem
to imply "sleight-of-hand" cross-subsidization of collective goods at the expense of non-collective goods from membership revenues, which if revealed
as such to members might rationally be repudiated.
These considerations largely explain the difference in the size of the
membership of consumer groups, such as C.A.C., which offer to members
20 The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971) at 12.
21

Id. at 13, 14.
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both non-collective goods and collective goods, and groups such as the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association which offer almost exclusively collective
goods. 22 The difference in membership in no way provides evidence that
Canadians value consumerism as a collective good any more highly than
civil libertarianism as a collective good. 2 s
Assuming that most members join an organization out of self-interest,
each member will have to countenance the fact that collective benefits generated by his and other members' fees will flow to all consumers, whether members or not. He will be making an indirect wealth transfer to non-members
with whom he will have to share the returns on his investment in a membership. The returns will be spread so thinly across all consumers that the
return to the individual member on his membership dues will not rationally
justify his investment.24 The only possible response to this impasse is to do
what, for example, professional associations have done, and legislatively
coerce all beneficiaries from association activities to become members so that
the cost of the collective benefits will be spread as thinly as the benefits.
In the case of consumer organizations the only practical instrument of coercion is the tax system: by the government paying grants to these organizations
by subventions out of revenue, all taxpayers in the country are, in effect,
compelled to become members of the organization so that all beneficiaries of
the collective goods produced by the organization bear a share of the cost of
obtaining them. In Canada, C.A.C. receives about $250,000 (about 40%
of its budget) each year by way of grant from the federal government. This
form of coercion raises important implications for theories of pluralism to
which we will return shortly.
Dr. George Stigler concludes, from a recognition of these various
political disabilities of consumerism, that "we can't construct - and I know
of no historical example of - a viable continuing broad based consumer
political lobby".25 The existing disabilities are impossible to gainsay; is there
22

3,000.

The difference in membership is presently something in the order of 100,000 to

23
Certain small groups, with highly concentrated memberships and the prospects
of obtaining collective goods of very great value (e.g. the imposition of a protective
tariff) will find it rational to pursue collective goals (see Olson, supra,note 20, chap. 1).
Also, the transaction costs of organizing large groups, relative to the collective benefits
achievable, are much greater than in the case of certain small groups (see Posner, supra,
note 11 at 330).
2
4 However, Stigler has recently pointed out that a free rider's ride is never entirely
free, merely cheap, because by not participating in the pursuit of collective goods from
which he will benefit, he increases the risk that the collective action will not be undertaken or at least undertaken as effectively, thus reducing the possibility of obtaining the
expected "free" gain: Free Riders and Collective Action (1974), 5 Bell J. of Econ. and
Mgmt. Science 359. Stigler, in the same article, suggests that a partial- explanation, at
least, of some large, latent interest group organizations may lie in considerations of
"asymmetry" of interests. For example, if a group of farmers with special interests were
to abstain from membership in a general Farmers Association, there may be a serious
risk that their interests would be abandoned altogether by the Association.
25
In G. Stigler and M. Cohen, Can Regulatory Agencies Protect Consumers?
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1971) at 49 (my italics).
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anythng in the contemporary political experience to provide a justification for
a more optimistic prognosis? By way of exploring whether Stigler's prognosis
can be confounded, it is now proposed to examine the treatment accorded to
the consumer interest in a specific class of public decisions, those made by
state regulatory agencies. In the final part of this article, we will abstract ourselves from this particular body of experience and venture to generalize
from it to some observations about the future role of the consumer interest
in public decision-making at large.
THE CONSUMER INTEREST IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS:
RECENT POLICY RESPONSES
Three myths surrounding the present nature of public regulation widely
persist. The first is that our economy is largely unregulated and is disciplined
mainly by competitive forces. In fact, in Canada, there are over one hundred
Federal regulatory agencies and in most provinces more than fifty regulatory
agencies.2 6 This does not include, of course, government Departments directly
administering regulatory statutes or subsidy programmes. Agencies and DeB.

partments regulate everything from telephone, rail and air-line rates, foreign

investment, capital markets, broadcasting licences, product tariffs, agricultural
produce prices, food, drug and safety standards to the licensing of various

classes of merchants, from insurance agents to door-to-door salesmen. Few
areas of our lives are untouched by public regulation.
The second myth is that most regulation involves technical questions
of little interest or relevance to the average citizen. Nothing could be further
from the truth. While many regulatory decisions may involve initially an
analysis of technically complex facts, once these facts have been ascertained,
the ultimate decision to be made will often be of an immensely important

political and social character, for example, highways versus public transport,
versus the environment, foreign investment versus economic
energy resources
27
sovereignty.
The third myth is that most major forms of regulation are forced on unwilling producers by hostile non-producer groups. In fact, the contrary is the
truth. Most of the extensively regulated industries, at least, prefer being regulated to competing and actively seek and sustain accommodating regulatory
regimes. As Stigler remarks,2 8 "as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."2 9 The sheltered life of
a regulated protectorate is likely to be more comfortable than life in a
vigorously competitive market-place. As Stigler elsewhere remarks:
Competition, like other therapeutic forms of hardship, is by wide and age-long

consent, highly beneficial to society when imposed upon -

other people. Every

26See Inventory of Provincial and Federal Regulatory Agencies prepared by the
Canadian Consumer Council, 1971.
27 Cf. Reich, supra, note 3.
28
Supra, note 11.
29
For a critique of Stigler's thesis, in terms of its ability to explain the emergence
of regulation in all its contexts, see R. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation (1974),
5 Bell J. of Econ. and Mgmt. Science 335.
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industry that can afford a spokesman has emphasized both its devotion to the
general principle, and the over-riding need for reducing competition within its
0
own markets because this is the one area in which competition works poorly.3
Regulatory issues have massive impacts on many more interests than
those of the regulatees, and the case for these other interests being represented
in this form of regulatory decision-making is, on the face of it, undeniable.
The consequences of a failure to be represented and heard are stated as

follows by a former Canadian Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs,
the Hon. John Turner (former Minister of Finance):
I've looked at a lot of regulatory agencies, and the longer rm around here, the
more I believe that every one of these tends, in a period of time, to reflect the
interests of the industry it is supposed to be regulating.31

The failure of government in the past to recognize that merely setting up
regulatory agencies to protect the public interest is not in itself enough is
vividly described by Rod Sykes, Mayor of Calgary, in Winnipeg, October 12,
1973:
In those cases where protest has been organized within the neighbourhood, there
is no funding to enable the residents to oppose the experts, the high-priced
engineers, and the real estate dealers. The government, in effect, has all the power
on its side. It sets up a public hearing format and says, now look, here you are,
a fair deal, a public hearing. We're going to hear from both sides and deliver our
verdict on the merits. That is exactly what Roman Emperors used to say to
them into the lion's den. One lion, one Christian, and
Christians when they invited
2
may the best lion win.3

The same phenomenon has been the subject of longer and more intense
concern in the U.S. As Roger C. Cramton, formerly Chairman of the U.S.
Administrative Conference recently stated:
The cardinal fact ... is that governmental agencies rarely respond to interests
that are not represented in their proceedings. And they are exposed, with rare
and somewhat insignificant exceptions, only to the view of those who have a
sufficient economic stake in a proceeding or succession of proceedings to warrant
the substantial expense of having lawyers and expert witnesses to make a case for
them. Non-economic interests or those economic interests that are diffuse in
character tend to be inadequately represented .... 33

30 Stigler & Cohen, supra,note 25 at 9.
31 Cited by Sack & Sack, Citizen'sAdvocates and Poverty Lawyers, Canadian Forum,
May, 1972 at 37. See also the comments of the Hon. Robert Andras, now Minister of Manpower and Immigration, (formerly Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs):
It is commonly observed phenomenon that sooner or later a regulating body
tends to identify with the interests of those it is regulating, unless there is strong
pressure either internally or externally to resist this tendency.
(Address to 25th Annual Meeting of C.A.C. 1972.)
8 2 Canadian Council on Urban & Regional Research, (1973) 5 Urban Research
Bulletin, no. 3 at 3.
83 The Why, Where & How of Broadened Public Participationin the Administrative Process (1972), 60 Georgetown L. 1. 525 at 529; see also William 0. Douglas, Go
East, Young Man (New York: Random House, 1974) at 216, 217; see generally M.
Bernstein, Regulating Business By Independent Commission (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1955).
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The problem of the "empty consumer's chair ' 8 4 in regulatory proceedings has now begun to elicit a variety of government responses, as governments
have come to recognize that, as the creators of these agencies, they carry the
primary responsibility for ensuring that their functions are effectively discharged.
1.

The U.S. Response: An Office of the ConsumerAdvocates

Early experiments, particularly during the New Deal of the Thirties
when the regulatory ideal was central to programmes for economic reconstruction, tended to involve appointing consumer advisory committees to certain
major agencies. Most of these quite quickly melted away as lack of independence, lack of resources, and lack of definition of role reduced them to
little more than window-dressing. 86
However, beginning in 1959 with the introduction of a bill by Senator
Estes Kefauver, a new adversarial model for representing the consumer interest
in regulatory proceedings began to emerge. Following Senator Kefauver's
death in 1963, Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal began refining this model in
a series of bills. Today a bi-partisan proposal with wide support has emerged
in the form of a statutory, government-funded Consumer Protection Agency
to represent the consumer interest before regulatory agencies and government
departments exercising regulatory powers. In early debates on this proposal,
the central idea itself attracted enormous controversy. Ralph Nader described
the Consumer Advocate bills as "the most important consumer legislation ever
considered by the U.S. Congress".3 7 On the other hand, already entrenched
interest groups were less enthusiastic. In a circular to its members in 1971,
the Chamber of Commerce said that Rosenthal's bill (H.R. 16) would help
"destroy the free enterprise system"3 8 (although in earlier Congressional hearings they had described it as a "thoughtful bill"). The Grocery Manufacturers
of America described the same bill to its members as "one of the most blatant
anti-business bills ever introduced".3 9 The National Small Business Association became even more excited. In a Congressional Committee brief, the
Association said:
Programs set forth by the international consumer movement in seeking to substitute a 'co-operative' society for our 'free enterprise' society are easily recognized
84
See Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal in Hearings on S. 1177 and H.R. 10835
Before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization and Government Research of
the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
85 The details that follow pertaining to the U.S. response are drawn from a paper
by the writer, The Case for an Ofice of the Consumer Advocate, prepared for the Canadian Consumer Council in 1972, and reproduced as Exhibit 36 of the Joint Hearings on
S. 707 and S. 160 of the Senate Committee on Government Operationsand Committee
on Commerce, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (March, April, June, 1973), to which all subsequent
citations relate.
36 See P. Campbell, Consumer Representation in the New Deal (New York: A.M.S.
Press, 1968).
87
See Trebilcock, supra, note 35 at 883.

38 Id. at 871.

39 Id.
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by the legislation pending before this subcommittee today. A campaign to make
the business community look as though it operates only in order to steal from the
poor has been successful.... Much that is being proposed today is based upon
experience in countries dominated by the co-operative consumers movement. The
blueprint for taking over private enterprise has been prepared. It is now being
followed. 40

As the central idea has won a measure of political acceptance, the focus
of recent debates has shifted to the powers that should attach to the new
Advocacy Office: for example, which agencies the Consumer Advocate should
be entitled to appear before; whether he should be entitled to intervene as a
full party in all agency proceedings, or whether his role should be that of
amicus curiae only; whether he should be entitled to intervene in agency proceedings of a penal nature; what rights of access the Consumer Advocate
should have to information held by other agencies and by the businesses regulated by those agencies; whether the Consumer Advocate should be able to
participate in, or be able to monitor, informal agency activity, for example,
hitherto ex parte informal communications, or decisions between regulators
and regulatees; and whether the Consumer Advocate should have the usual
rights to appeal to the Courts from agency decisions if he did not participate
in the initial proceedings. Disputes between the executive and legislative
branches on issues of independence, such as mechanisms for hiring and firing
the Consumer Advocate, and for insulating him from budgetary pressures have
also produced controversy. Finally, the issue of the extent of government funding to be committed to the Office has produced divergent views, with different
sponsors' bills making provision for sums ranging from $7 million to $25
million a year.
However, by the time this article appears, it seems almost certain that a
Consumer Protection Agency Act will have been passed by Congress, subject
to a Presidential veto, and an Office of the Consumer Advocate created. 41
2.

The United Kingdom Response: A DepartmentalNational
Consumers' Agency

In September, 1974, the U.K. Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection tabled in the House of Commons a document called National
Consumers' Agency indicating the intention of the government to set up a
government-funded, non-statutory agency, with members appointed by the
40 Id.
41
For the bill passed by the House, see H. R. 1316, 93d Cong. 2d. Sess. (April 4,
1974). For the bill before the Senate, see S. 707, 93d Cong. 2d. Sess. (February 1, 1973).
For recent House Hearings, see Hearings on H.R. 14, H.R. 21 and H.R. Before the
House Committee on Government Operations,93d Cong. 1st Sess. (September & October, 1973). For recent Senate hearings, see Joint Hearings on S. 707 and S. 1160 Before
the Senate Committee on Government Operations and Committee on Commerce, 93d
Cong. 1st Sess. (March, April, and June, 1973). See also the House Committee on
Government Operations Rep. No. 93-962 on H.R. 13163, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (March
29, 1974); the Senate Committee on Government Operations Rep. No. 93-883 on S. 707,
93d Cong. 2d Sess. (May 28, 1974); the Minority Report of the same Committee (May
29, 1974), and the Senate Committee on Commerce Rep. No. 93-792 on S. 707, 93d
Cong. 2d Sess. (April 11, 1974).
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Minister, to represent the consumer interest on all consumer issues before all
levels and agencies of government. Few further details were provided in the
governmenfs announcement but clearly the principal functions of the agency
will be of an advocacy character.
3.

The CanadianResponse: C.A.C.'s Advocacy Programme
D)uring the tenure of the Hon. Ron Basford as Minister of Consumer
and Corporate Affairs, the Canadian Consumer Council, a citizens' advisory
agency to government, was asked in 1971 to commission independent
research over a four year period into the status of the consumer interest in
proceedings of independent regulatory agencies, decisions by agricultural
marketing boards, the conduct of the self-governing professions, and the operations of Crown corporations. The first two stages of this research have been
completed and the last two stages are now proceeding under the aegis of the
new Consumer Research Council.
In June, 1973, the Hon. Herb Gray, then Minister of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs, announced that as an interim experiment the Government
was making a special unconditional grant of $100,000 to the Consumers
Association of Canada to enable it to intensify and expand its advocacy
activities. Of this sum, $35,000 was allocated by C.A.C. to formal advocacy
activities before regulatory agencies. Early in 1974, the Federal Government
announced that it was extending the experiment a further year with a grant of
$116,000, all of this money to be used in regulatory proceedings, appeals
therefrom and test cases in the courts. For 1975-76, the grant has been increased to $215,000 to permit more fundamental policy research on the
regulated industries to be undertaken. With these grants, C.A.C. has set up
an advocacy unit in its Ottawa office, staffed by three lawyers, three secretaries and assisted by outside technical experts and counsel on retainer paid
for out of the balance of the grant. Most of the activities of the programme
have been directed at the regulatory arena.
While it is not the purpose of this article to explore the finer intricacies of
public utility regulation and related regulatory issues, it may be useful to
survey quickly the principal initiatives of the programme since it was implemented in September, 1973.
The first regulatory initiative by CA.C.'s advocacy programme was
taken in late 1973 following an application by Ontario Hydro (a Crown
corporation) to the National Energy Board (N.E.B.) for a licence to export
hydro-electric power to the United States. The particular proposal envisaged
the importation of coal from Appalachia in the U.S. for firing coal-burning
generators located in Ontario near major metropolitan centres and the exportation of the power so produced back to the U.S. (the U.S. was to get the power,
Ontario the pollution). Ontario Hydro estimated that the net gain to Hydro
from this proposal was of the order $6 to $8 million annually. C.A.C. and
Pollution Probe, an environmental group, jointly intervened in the hearing
before the N.E.B., objecting that the estimated net economic worth of the
proposal failed to take into account substantial social costs in the form of
environmental degradation which witnesses for the intervenors estimated at
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$8.5 million per annum, and which Ontario Hydro was, in effect, attempting
to disregard by imposing on the public at large. Ontario Hydro submitted
no serious evidence on this issue. The N.E.B., in the result, found that these
estimates of environmental costs were too speculative and granted the licence
application. The decision was later confirmed by the federal Cabinet. C.A.C.
and Pollution Probe then sought leave to appeal to the Federal Court of
Appeal, asserting that the N.E.B. had failed to follow its own regulations and
previous decisions in not requiring Ontario Hydro to carry the burden of
satisfying the Board on the environmental impact of its proposal, and asserting further that the Board's submission of its decision to the Cabinet for
confirmation before making it public allowed persons to participate in its
decision who had not heard the evidence and were not members of the
Board. Leave to appeal was refused by the Court.
On the face of it, the outcome of the case represented an unqualified loss
for C.A.C. However, in this kind of advocacy, wins and losses are not so
easily calculated. For example, both Ontario Hydro and the N.E.B. have
subsequently hired social cost analysts to assist in future applications, and in
similar cases that have since come before the Board much more rigorous
requirements as to environmental impact considerations have been imposed.
Moreover, the considerable media publicity that attended the case may have
contributed to a heightened public consciousness about social costs - a consciousness needed, for example, to prompt decisions like that of the federal
government to set up the Berger Commission to assess the impact of the
Mackenzie Valley pipe-line on the Northern environment and native peoples.4
Early in 1974, the Bell Canada "B" rate application hearings before the
Canadian Transport Commission commenced. The telephone rate increase
sought would have given Bell an additional $51.8 million during 1974, had
it been granted on January 1 of that year. The hearing lasted 47 days. Bell
spent nearly $1 million on its case (all tax deductible and included in its
rates). The outcome of the case was disappointing for C.A.C., which devoted
a great deal of its time and limited resources to it. All but $4 million
of the requested increase was granted. The $4 million reduction did, on the
other hand, occur in areas where C.A.C. had placed some emphasis - the
proposed across-the-board increases in charges for pay telephones, which
were denied in institutions with a predominance of low-income consumers.
Other issues which were argued with less success focussed on whether crosssubsidization of business subscribers by residential subscribers was involved;
definition of the quality of service to be received for a given tariff; whether
the company's huge construction programme really was needed (or might
involve an element of rate base padding) and really would benefit consumers
(as opposed to other classes of service user); whether Bell could be intelligently regulated when many of its most profitable activities had been spun
off to unregulated subsidiaries, such as Northern Electric, enabling Bell to
argue, in relation to its regulated activities, perpetual pending financial doom;

42 Order-in-Council, 1974-641, March 21, 1974, pursuant to s. 19(h) of the Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-6.
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and whether some part of Bell's monopoly could be deregulated and exposed
to market forces, for example, the provision of terminal equipment.
Again, however, it is difficult to make a long-term assessment of this
kind of intervention by C.A.C. The hearings attracted considerable media
publicity. Bell rate cases have long been matters of major public contention
in Canada, and perhaps partly in response to a continuing climate of public
concern at ever more frequent rate increases and partly, no doubt, as an
attempt at rationalization, the federal government, shortly after this case, announced its intention to transfer all telecommunications regulation to the
one of the most socially responCanadian Radio and Television 4Commission,
8
sive federal regulatory agencies.
On June 21, 1974, Air Canada (a Crown corporation), Canadian Pacific
Airlines, and five regional air carriers filed simultaneously before the Canadian
Transport Commission (C.T.C.) for a 9.5% average across-the-board air
passenger fare increase. This followed only five months after a 10% increase
in February, compounding to a 20% increase within that period. By simply
filing a piece of paper containing the proposed rate increases and waiting
thirty days the airlines automatically receive the increases unless the Commission decides to stop the increase. The C.T.C. has never exercised this power.
At very short notice, C.A.C. decided to intervene before the C.T.C., asking
the Commission for an injunction to hold up the rate increases long enough
to allow a full hearing of the case. The C.T.C., after a preliminary hearing
on the question of an injunction, decided on Friday, July 12 to grant a full
hearing to commence on the following Tuesday. A request for a two-week
adjournment by C.A.C. and the Government of Saskatchewan to consider the
evidence of the airlines and to brief appropriate expert witnesses was refused,
as was a request that the airlines be required to furnish relevant cost information to the intervenors.
On Tuesday, July 16, the Commission, in a preliminary ruling, held that
the case would be heard under s. 10 of the Aeronautics Act,4 rather than
s. 23 of the National TransportationAct,45 which had the effect of placing on
C.A.C. the burden of proving that the proposed rates were not reasonable,
rather than the airlines having to prove the converse. With no substantial
evidence ready at that point, for C.A.C. the result was a foregone conclusion.
The hearing concluded on Friday of the same week (47 days to analyze Bell,
4 days to master the airlines). The Commission intimated that it would
reach its decision quickly so that the airlines would not have to wait for their
increases (the 30 days had not run out), and the following Monday granted
the rate increases in full, at the same time heavily criticizing C.A.C. for what
it apparently regarded as a close-to-frivolous intervention.
However, demonstrating the importance of Nadel's "widening the scope
of the conflict" theory of consumer effectiveness, 4" C.A.C. was able very
43

See Bill C-5, October 2, 1974.
R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3.
45 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17.
44
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6 Supra, note
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effectively to utilize the media during these proceedings, and in reportage and
editorials, both the airlines and the Commission received heavy criticism the airlines for the cumulative magnitude of their fare increases, for the
apparent complicity that had occurred before the new rates were filed, and
for their arrogance in charging the new rates before the Commission had
confirmed them; the Commission because of its passivity toward the airlines,
when in an era of runaway inflation each rate increase ought to be meticulously scrutinized and exactingly proved, and because of its patronizing attitude to consumers impertinent enough to disturb the tranquil regulatory waters
by asking some pertinent questions. A more concrete result of the case and
the publicity attending it is that while the airlines announced at the time of the
hearing that they would need to file for further rate increases in the late fall
of 1974, they did not deem it expedient to return to the regulatory bar for
further public replenishment until May, 1975 - at a saving to consumers of
perhaps $10 million a month.
The treatment of C.A.C. by the Commission in a passenger rail rate
application further demonstrates the Commission's pro-industry passivity.
C.A.C., in a preliminary hearing in April, 1974, asked for a full hearing on
the merits on proposed new railway tariffs for Canadian National and Canadian Pacific. Five months later the Commission had still not decided whether
to grant such a hearing on the merits. Because of the thirty day rule, the new
rates had been in effect during most of the period and even if the Commission
had decided that they were not justified, there was no practicable way of
reimbursing consumers who, in the meantime, paid the higher tariff. Moreover, by the time of a hearing on the merits, the rate increases might well have
been justified, if they had not been five months before, and, as well, the next
rate application would be shortly pending. In protest at the Commission's
handling of the case, C.A.C. in September withdrew its intervention, thus ter47
minating proceedings, and in an open letter to the Minister of Transportation
drew attention to the "shocking" disparity in the way the Commission had
handled the airline and rail rate cases.
In January, 1975, leave to appeal new rate increases by the railways was
granted to C.A.C. and other consumer groups by the C.T.C. and a full, month's
long inquiry ordered into all aspects of the passenger rail mode in Canada.
An interim order to hold up the rate increases until the outcome of this
inquiry is known was refused, but nevertheless the decision of the C.T.C. to
institute, for the first time, a full-scale inquiry represents a substantial potential advance of the consumer interest in this area. A further application by
the airlines for another 10% rate increase came before the C.T.C. in May,
1975, which, after an eight day hearing on the merits was granted in full,
despite unrefuted evidence that economy-class passengers are massively subsidizing first-class passengers, passengers on western air-routes are subsidizing
those on eastern air-routes, and expert evidence that Air Canada is substantially less efficient than Canadian Pacific. The C.T.C. took a week-end to
arrive at a verbal decision. C.A.C. and several provincial governments have
appealed the decision to the Federal Cabinet.
47 The

Hon. Jean Marchand, reported in the Ottawa Journal, Sept. 9, 1974.
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The Federal Minister of Transport recently declared transportation policy
in Canada to be "a mess" 48 and on June 16, 1975 tabled in Parliament a
Green Paper proposing major changes to existing policy which would give
much more direct authority to the Minister in inter-modal co-ordination and
rationalization of transportation resources.
Several other regulatory initiatives should be briefly mentioned. Early in
1974, C.A.C. presented a brief at the National Energy Board hearings on oil
export quotas, arguing that industry data on which the N.E.B. had previously
relied vastly over-stated realistic oil reserves and asking for a rapid phasingout of U.S. oil exports with a view to developing long-term self-sufficiency in
Canada. C.A.C. presented similar arguments at recent hearings before the
N.E.B. on natural gas export quotas. Gratifyingly, perhaps in part as a result
of the intervention of C.A.C. and other similar organizations, the N.E.B. and
the federal government have now dramatically revised their estimates of oil
reserves and the federal government has announced a programme to scale
down oil exports.
Several major non-regulatory initiatives by C.A.C.'s advocacy programme
provincial regulatory arenas. Interventions have taken place before the Alberta
Public Utilities Board in a Calgary Power hydro-electric rate hearing; before
the Nova Scotia Public Utilities Commission in a Maritime Telegraph and
Telephone rate hearing; before the New Brunswick Public Utilities Commission in a New Brunswick telephone rate hearing; before the British Columbia
Energy Commission in a Pacific Northern Gas rate hearing; and in an Ontario
Hydro rate hearing before the Ontario Energy Board. In both the latter two
cases, substantial concessions were won for the consumer on the issue of crosssubsidization of high-volume industrial users (who had previously been given
large volume discounts) by low-income residential users. On the regional
advocacy front, several provincial governments are now actively considering
funding consumer advocacy programmes.
Several major non-regulatory initiatives by C.A.C.'s advocacy programme
have been taken. Late in 1973, in response to the Ontario Government's
Green Paper on Consumer Warranties, C.A.C. presented a very detailed
brief to the provincial Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations pointing out that all the new substantive rights in the world would be of no value
to the consumer without the introduction of realistic enforcement mechanisms.
The brief developed an integrated set of proposals for utilizing arbitration
mechanisms, reformed Small Claims Courts, superior courts, and class action
procedures, relating these procedural instruments to defined categories of
consumer complaints. At the same time C.A.C. commissioned a substantial,
independent research paper from Professor Neil Williams of Osgoode Hall
Law School on the law relating to consumer class actions in Canada, together with proposals for reform and a Model Consumer Class Actions Act.
Now completed, the report has received wide currency within federal and provincial governments across Canada and is under active consideration by
several who have reform of their class action rules under review. 49
48
49

FinancialPost, November 2, 1974, p. T-1.
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In the civil test case area, C.A.C.'s major initiative has been to support
with money, staff and outside expertise a $5 million class action commenced
by a private law firm on behalf of 5,000 Firenza owners against General
Motors claiming loss of resale value resulting from the bad reputation acquired
by the cars as a model because of the abnormally high incidence of defects
exhibited by an allegedly large number of units. This action will test a number
of important substantive points of warranty and products liability law as well
as important procedural points pertaining to consumer class actions. Even
if the case is ultimately lost, it may well serve to dramatize the shortcomings
of the present law and precipitate legislative action. Importantly, the economic
case for collective consumer representation mechanisms in a civil context is
similar to that for collective representation of the consumer interest in regulatory and legislative contexts: a single supplier may stand to make substantial
gains from violation of consumers' civil rights but the damage to individual
consumers will often be so thinly spread that collective, not individual, suit is
the only rational avenue of redress.
How should we evaluate the aggregate impact of this flurry of specialized
advocacy on behalf of the consumer? Have consumerism's political disabilities been effectively denied?
C. AN INTERIM STOCK-TAKING
1. Short Run Lessons
(i) In the immediate context, the need for sustained, systematic consumer advocacy before regulatory agencies is unanswerable. Sensitizing regulators to interests other than those of the regulatees is not a short-term
exercise and is not a matter that can be allowed to depend on fortuitous,
sporadic interventions by the odd concerned citizen or group of citizens.
Appropriate institutional forms need to be devised to ensure a consistent
consumer presence.
(ii) The essentially political nature of the regulatory process must be
recognized by both regulators and legislators. The argument that regulatory
agencies should be "independent" of the political process misconceives their
function. Because of the immensely important economic and social decisions
that agencies make, strong emphasis must be placed by governments in searching out high calibre personnel for appointment to the boards and staff of
these agencies. The tendency to retread retired political warriors and reward
party bagmen by appointing them to positions on agencies, and the added
tendency to appoint personnel with back-grounds, directly or indirectly, related to the regulated industries, on the grounds that they alone possess the
requisite expertise, discounts the need to find appointees of high intellectual
calibre with a wide range of social sensitivities.
A substantial increase in the quantity and quality of research as opposed
to administrative resources available to an agency is needed if agencies are
to become less dependent on industry data and analyses. Regulators also
have to be educated to understand the fundamental difference between highly
concentrated and thinly spread interest groups. In connection with the previous
political anlysis of interest groups, regulators must be made to realize that to
take the view that consumers should not be concerned about a $52 million
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telephone rate increase because it only costs them 20 or 30 cents more each
a month (although, obviously, it costs them in aggregate $52m) is subversive
of the need ever to take the consumer interest into account in public decisionmaking. Without that recognition, consumers will systematically be "nickelled"
and "dimed" into economic oblivion, dying the death of a thousand nearinvisible cuts.
(iii) Low-intensity groups embarking on this form of advocacy need
to recognize the importance of advocating their cause not only in relevant
regulatory forums but also before the public, by proper utilization of the
relatively costless media. By "widening the scope of the conflict", an appropriate climate of public concern in the regulatory outcome can be created
which forces the regulators to address the matters about which the public is
concerned. This involves advocacy skills which traditional professional training
does not provide for public interest advocates. These have to be consciously
learned. Also, new strategic criteria for assessing "wins" and "losses" have
to be learned as alternatives to the way the traditional practising lawyer makes
such an assessment in a case-to-case setting.
(iv) There is a powerful case for establishing a set of minimum procedural standards for guiding the conduct of regulatory proceedings. For
example, there should be consistent rules applying to most agencies governing
the amount and nature of notice to other parties; the right to a hearing on the
merits; who carries the onus of proof; the right to issue interrogatories to, and
cross-examine, parties and obtain relevant information from them; the right
to standing both before an agency and before the courts on an appeal from an
agency's decision; and the right of non-business intervenors to a free transcript.
Also, agencies should be given a discretion at the outset of a hearing to award
the costs of an intervention, out of the projected rate increase, or public funds
in non-rate cases, to serious low-intensity, non-subsidized intervenors. This
will help keep the process as open as possible. Either an omnibus Act, similar
in concept to the Ontario Statutory Powers Procedures Act 5° or the U.S.
Administrative Procedure Act51 but emphasizing ease of access as much as
due process, or at least amendment of individual regulatory statutes with a
52
view to the same end, is badly needed.
In addition, the much larger question of the right of public access to
government information, whether within regulatory agencies or elsewhere
within government urgently calls for a response. The continuing refusal of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency, under the Foreign Investment Review
Act,53 to give more than derisory reasons for its decisions is a contemporary
example of this need.
With government expenditures now comprising 40% of Canada's G.N.P.,
increasingly consumers are consuming, and paying for, public rather than
private goods. Government has been very willing to impose packaging, label50 S.O. 1971, c. 47.
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ling and other informational requirements on the private sector but has been
much more reticent in imposing similar requirements on itself so that the
public can more efficiently evaluate the worth of government programmes.
Legislation similar to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act 54 should be developed and enacted in each legislative jurisdiction as a matter of the highest
priority.r5 If these matters are attended to, the attaching of sweeping special
powers to a Consumer Advocacy programme, as envisaged in the U.S. proposals, becomes less necessary and smacks of a special status for one interest
group, which is hard to justify. Consistent with the previous political analysis,
most of the foregoing suggestions involve ways of reducing information and
participation costs (i.e. opportunity costs) to the public.
The teaching of Administrative Law in the law schools also needs to
adjust to the real dynamics, and problems, of the regulatory process. Judicial
review and the prerogative writs - favourite pre-occupations of administrative lawyers - are mostly irrelevant to the issues raised by the activities of
major regulatory agencies today.
(v) It is important from the point of view of political legitimacy that
any consumer advocacy programme, even though state subsidized, be under
citizen control so that broad priorities and positions reflect the views of those
on whose behalf they are presented. Without this, such a programme is likely
to degenerate into a highly paternalistic, elitist, personal power play, in which
an oblivious constituency is illegitimately co-opted to provided the professional advocates with the appearance of a populist platform. The absence of
this safeguard appears to be a major weakness in the U.S. proposals. The
sentiments expressed by Peter Newman, in an editorial in Macleans magazine of April, 1974, need to be nurtured:
Many of the really important decisions that will fundamentally affect and transform our future are being made not by parliament but by regulatory agencies ....
If [they] are to take the public interest seriously into account, [they] must provide
a mechanism for hearing directly from the people. That will require the funding
of third party interventions which represent no vested interests .....
Politicians and particularly bureaucrats get feeling edgy and threatened whenever
they're faced by real people with live opinions. They shouldn't be. They are being
threatened only with enlightenment.

2.

Long-run Problems

While we have been focussing our attention on C.A.C.'s experience in the
regulatory arena, the long-run issues raised by it are not confined to the regulatory arena but relate to the political process at large, and are not restricted
to the consumer movement but relate to the role of any large, latent, interest

group in the political process. Some serious long-run problems are exemplified
by C.A.C.'s experience in the regulatory arena:
(i) Being funded by the party in power by executive grant, C.A.C.'s
54 5 U.S.C. para. 552.
55 For rudimentary discussions of the U.S. Administrative ProcedureAct and Freedons of Information Act, see B. Schwartz and H. W. R. Wade, Legal Control of Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at 108ff, 77ff 329ff, and 339ff. For a more
detailed discussion of these two Acts, see generally K. C. Davis, Administrative Law
Text (3rd ed. St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1972).
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advocacy programme faces the danger of compromising its independence
through concern over funding continuity. This has not proved to be a problem
to date, but as the programme becomes more effective, as government departments find their regulatory policies called into public question, and as other,
entrenched, interest groups begin to find life less comfortable than formerly,
it is reasonable to assume that this danger will not always be hypothetical.
This problem would not seem insuperable and would seem to require a legislative framework for the programme that carries insulating elements designed to
ensure its independence from party politics in matters of priorities, policies,
personnel and budget. At least, then, changes would be effected through parliamentary, and thus public, debate.
(ii) The question of the constituency for whom consumer advocates
speak poses more fundamental problems. Just as disproportionately few citizens will find it worthwhile to join a consumer organization offering mostly collective goods, so also will most of those who do join find that it is unlikely to be
worthwhile to participate extensively in collective goods decision-making. Thus,
in C.A.C., only a handful of members find it worth the effort even to vote for
membership of the association's small Board of Directors, let alone involve
themselves further in the formulation of the association's policies. This might
have been predicted from Olson's analysis and is confirmed by Kariel,ro who
stresses the essentially oligarchical character of large, latent, interest groups.
Compounding this factor, in the case of C.A.C.'s advocacy programme,
is the fact that every taxpaying citizen in the country has, in effect, been
coerced into membership of the association, with all the massive role conflicts
that this entails. Was C.A.C. speaking for the President of Bell Telephone
and the Presidents and shareholders of the airlines and railways (all contributors to its programme) in its recent interventions? Who was it in fact
speaking for, and with what mandate? Where all members of all interest
groups are coerced into becoming members of one oligarchically controlled
interest group,57theories of pluralism and interest group liberalism start to look
a little shaky.
56

Supra, note 12, chap. 14.
The problem is, in fact, much more pervasive than this. Business lobby groups
may deduct their lobbying expenses from income for tax purposes and thus, in effect,
transfer some of the cost of their lobbying activities to the general body of taxpayers,
who are not voluntarily part of their constituency. The financial figures involved in this
form of coercion dwarf the government's grant to C.A.C. but collectively call into
question the rationality of the whole theory of interest group pluralism when groups
can no longer be clearly identified or delineated. As a matter of interest, should
not every citizen who expends time and money in pursuing any collective good be able
to claim the expenses as a tax deduction, if business can? Alternatively, should nobody
be able to claim them? (cf. D. Bond, "Consumerism and Consumer Protection," in L.
Smith, ed., Issues in Canadian Economics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1974) at
98). On a similar point, should not every consumer with a justified individual complaint
against business be able to recover "aggravation" damage (transaction and opportunity
costs) in pursuing the complaint to equalize business's ability to treat such costs on its
side as costs of doing business? (cf. Jarvisv. Swan Tours, [1973] 1 All E.R. 71 (C.A.).)
For an argument favouring coerced support of collective goods decision-making to
solve the free-rider problem, see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap
Press, 1971) at 267.
57
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(iii) Even if the constituency issue can somehow be resolved, pluralist
concepts of interest group liberalism themselves are coming under increasing
question as operational philosophies for intelligent government of modem
mixed economies. Critics of pluralist philosophies point out that the open-ended
delegations of power by legislatures to regulatory agencies which have become
typical are antithetical to rational planning of societal priorities and policies.
Lowi asserts bluntly: "Interest group liberalism renders government impotent.
Liberal governments cannot plan".58 Substituted both for the allocative function of a competitive marketplace and that of central planning is interest group
bargaining through an almost infinite number of largely autonomous regulatory agencies under no compulsion to act in concert in furtherance of more
general collective policy goals. Thus, participation,organization,structure and
process become ends in themselves. Let students, women, workers, the poor,
ethnic groups, consumers, etc. organize, and all problems (if any are agreed
upon) will go away. The rationality and over-all coherence of substantive outputs become subordinate to these new means-ends.
A further objection sometimes urged against a pluralist approach is that
it is impossible to ensure participation by all affected interest groups, present
and future, in public decision-making processes affecting them. As Charles
Reich writes:
The very concept of balancing is in one sense a contradiction of the concept of
planning. Fashioning values and goals out of existing interests prevents any
really long-range policy-making or planning from ever being done. It equates
policy-making with satisfying the majority or the most powerful interest, although
the country might benefit more from policies which favour weaker or minority
interests, or interests not yet in existence. It tends to place emphasis on those
interests which have a commercial or pecuniary value as against intangible interests
such as scenery or recreation. The most fundamental infirmity of the present con-

cept of the public interest as a guide for planning is that it defeats planning by
responding only to immediate pressures.59

To bring all affected, extant groups into the political process would
involve massive state support.6 0 This might create in turn several new problems, albeit of a lesser kind, such as the emergence of groups looking only for
new, paid occupations (a new kind of unemployment insurance), and the
further paralysis of regulatory proceedings as participants multiply. In the
case of future interest groups (for example, the interest of people as yet unborn
in present decisions affecting their environment), it is difficult to see any
solution.
In addition to these pragmatic problems, there is the more fundamental
question of the ideological stake which supporters of the doctrine of pluralism
(particulariy those who gain substantially from it) have in perpetuating the
58 Supra, note 4 at 288; see also Kariel, supra, note 12; Presthus, supra, note 3 at
348.
59 Supra, note 3 at 1239.
00 The conscious creation by the State of necessary new countervailing power groups
is explicitly urged by a number of commentators: see e.g. J. K. Galbraith, American
Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1956),
chap. X; Kariel, supra, note 12 at 272.
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pluralist philosophy and not admitting or encouraging groups who will expose
the philosophy to fundamental challenge. As Wolff writes:
Pluralism is not explicitly a philosophy of privilege or injustice - it is a philosophy
of equality and justice whose concrete application supports inequality by ignoring
the existence of certain legitimate social groups. This ideological function of
pluralism helps to explain one of the peculiarities of American politics. There is
a very sharp distinction in the public domain between legitimate interests and
those which are absolutely beyond the pale. If a group or interest is within the
framework of acceptability, then it can be sure of winning some measure of what
it seeks, for the process of national politics is distributive and compromising. On
the other hand, if an interest falls outside the circle of the acceptable, it receives
no attention whatsoever and its proponents are treated as crackpots, extremists, or
foreign agents.61

In other words, "plural" has a tendency to become strictly limited. The

implication of this restricted interpretation of pluralism for citizens' advocacy
programmes is that apart from problems of internal group dynamics which
tend in the same direction, continued state support of such programmes over
the long-term appears likely to be contingent on broad acceptance by the
groups concerned of the parameters of the regulatory status quo. Funding for
established groups is also likely to be used as an excuse for not supporting
other groups who wish to challenge political and regulatory policies in very
fundamental or radical ways. Public participation in the regulatory process
is likely to be seen as lending new legitimacy to, and thus re-inforcing and
perpetuating, what may be inherently illegitimate or irrational processes.
Strategically, in terms of an interest group's public posture, it may be very
difficult simultaneously to opt in and opt out. The danger of co-optation by the
status quo is a critically serious one. Its costs will be more fully explored below
in the discussion of the rationale of regulation.
One final objection to subscribing to a doctrine of pluralism that is
sometimes urged is that the doctrine implies a fundamentally uncivilized view
of society. Collectivists such as Wolff see it as involving a form of government by guerilla warfare. Wolff writes:
We must give up the image of society as a battleground of competing groups and
formulate an ideal society more exalted than the mere acceptance of opposed
interests and diverse customs. There is need for a new philosophy of community.6 2

The dilemma raised by this view is that even if we wish to move to a more

collectivist approach to decisions about resource allocations, how does one
interest group detach itself from the adversary ethic without making itself
highly vulnerable to the depredations of other groups? How do we reach
for "Consciousness Ill" without becoming Uncle Toms? On the other hand,
if the solution lies in a spontaneous shift in community-wide values, does this
leave us waiting, perhaps forlornly, for the Apocalypse?
(iv) The possibility, through participation in the regulatory process, of
being co-opted into accepting and endorsing its essential forms carries serious
61 The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968) at 154; cf. Presthus,
supra, note 3 at 349.
621d. at 161.
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potential costs. First, it involves the consumer movement acquiescing in the
incoherence and decisional dysfunctions produced by the random outputs of
the fragmented, proliferating regulatory regimes of the modem state. 3 A
related cost is acquiescence in the increasing paralysis of the total apparatus,
in terms of its ability to respond quickly, rationally, and decisively, to rapidly
changing social challenges and crises.64 The inability of government in Canada
to evolve coherent national or even regional policies in such key sectors as
energy, food, transportation and housing, exemplifies these costs of the
modem regulatory state.
Another cost goes to conventional considerations of economic efficiency
raised by the fact of regulation itself. A growing group of commentators from
Ralph Nader, 5 on the one hand, to Lewis Engman, the Nixon-appointed
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, on the other, are now urging
massive de-regulation of the economy and an attempt to restore vigorously
competitive markets, wherever possible. At least in such a market, a consumer has to decide that it is worth his while to incur the transaction costs
entailed in participating in a transaction before his interests can be affected.
In other words, he will have to be privy to most market decisions which affect
his economic interests as a consumer, unlike most regulatory decisions
which affect those interests. In Canada, prime sectors for substantial deregulation and enforced competition might include transportation, communications, banking, agriculture, and the professions. As a society, we can no
longer operate effectively the elaborate, intricately interwoven regulatory

03

A current example of this kind of incoherence is that, despite the declared goal
of the Federal Government of national self-sufficiency in oil, the unco-ordinated attempts
of the Federal Government, Provincial Governments and assorted Energy Boards and
Commissions to tax and otherwise regulate the oil industry may produce exactly the
opposite result.
A further example of regulatory confusion is the history of the 45-foot height limit
by-law regulating development in downtown Toronto passed two years ago by the
Toronto City Council and evolved and implemented through endless Council Committees. In its application, random exceptions were increasingly made and in late 1974,
it was overturned by the Ontario Municipal Board (O.M.B.) from whose decision the
City appealed to the Provincial Cabinet - in the meantime total confusion as to who
is running Toronto, how, and towards what goals. Another interesting insight from this
case is that in two municipal elections, a substantial percentage of citizens had felt
it worthwhile to incur the information and opportunity costs entailed in voting in a
"control development" council. In the lengthy hearings on the by-law before the O.M.B.,
a non-elected body of technocrats (who described the Council's decision as "political" what else should it have been?), only 36 developers and the City Council itself found it
rational to incur the much higher costs of participating. No citizens seriously participated.
The outcome was predictable.
04A current example of this paralysis is the housing sector. While the federal
government has made large sums of money available in an attempt to alleviate the acute
shortage of low-income housing, various municipalities have refused the funding on the
ground that the restricted property tax base given them by senior levels of government
does not enable them to raise the revenues to service lower priced housing. The federal
government, provincial government and municipalities seem incapable of co-ordinating
all the pieces of a compatible policy capable of decisively addressing the housing crisis.
O5See Green, Nader, & Winter, supra, note 11.
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infra-structure that we have developed. Daniel Patrick Moynihan made this
point simply but poignantly in a speech to a NATO meeting in 1970:
modem government must learn to respond to technologically induced difficulties with something of the same economy of talent that technology has devised. We
cannot go on devising government arrangements that only extraordinary men
can make work. Most of the work of the world has to be done by men of average
endowment, energy, and social vision.
...

Where competitive markets are not possible, increasingly we must accept
the stark alternative of much more direct, explicit, unashamed, central planning. A major political advantage of greater use of central planning instruments is that interest group inter-action is more focussed, more circumscribed,
and more visible, and outcomes are subject to more political accountability. 66
Effective central planning entails, at a minimum, much greater use than at
present of central regulatory instruments, such as tax, tariff, and competition
policies. However, as the experience with competition policy and tax reform
in this country has shown, a bold range of additional steps must be contemplated if the ideal of a more coherent, widely responsive central planning
process is to be seriously pursued. An agenda for future research might focus
on issues such as the following: Where regulatory agencies are found indispensable, would much more detailed, frequent, legislated policy directions to
the agencies be desirable and feasible? 67 Should the central government, or,
where appropriate, regional government, have the power to over-rule the
decisions of major agencies on the basis of published reasons open to parliamentary and public debate? Should all major agencies and Crown corporations be accountable, through a Cabinet Minister, to Parliament? Should much
greater research support from general revenues be provided to opposition
parties (also large, latent, interest groups), individual M.P.'s and Parliamentary Committees, in the hope that the central political process might then
exercise a more effective, direct, oversight role in relation to the agencies,
Crown Corporations, and government subsidy programmes? Should the heads
of these agencies and programmes be personally and regularly accountable to
Parliament in Parliamentary Committee debates on estimates? Should traditional Anglo-Canadian concepts of civil service tenure be preserved, or
should there be a much greater ability in the central political authority to
hire (from anywhere) and fire (at any time) regulators, Deputy Ministers,
Assistant Deputy Ministers and other senior civil servants influential in policy
formulation to prevent dissonance and foot-dragging in the command structure.68 Another line of inquiry which bears exploration is whether regulatory
officials (and thus, indirectly, government) should, in some contexts (for
example, food, drug, product safety, securities regulation, and welfare entitle6

6See Lowi, supra, note 4; Kariel, supra, note 12; Heilbroner, supra, note 16; G.
Myrdal, Beyond tha Welfare State (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1960).
67 Cf. Lowi, id., Chap. 10; Bernstein, supra, note 33 at 284-86.
68
As to arguments for the need for appropriate lines of political accountability for
regulatory decision-makers, see Bernstein, id. Chap. 5; The President's Advisory Council
on Executive Organization, (the Ash Council), Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies, January 1971 at 14 et seq; Kariel, supra, note 12, Chap. 15; Lowi, id.,

Chap. 10.
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ments) be held civilly liable for negligence to aggrieved citizens, thus attaching
private costs to those who make bad public decisions and creating additional
incentives for a more responsive regulatory environment? 69 Effective central
planning may also entail a much more effective over-sfght function by the
Courts in relation to legislative and regulatory activity. For example, within
the interstices of the law left open to judicial interpretation (for example
"inter-provincial trade and commerce") should the courts more consciously
promote substantive rationality of economic outputs, and retreat less into
legal formalism? 70 In the case of the Federal Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of Canada, is there a case for appointing to the Court two or
three luminous non-legal intellects, with a pervasive sense of the larger social
and economic fabric in which particular issues arise, and not merely the
limited technical considerations raised by those issues? Should litigants be
more actively encouraged to address issues of policy rationality in their
submissions? Should Brandeis briefs be invited from interest groups indirectly
affected by the outcome of major judicial decisions? Should legislation limit
or prescribe corporate campaign contributions and provide for the funding
of election campaigns out of public funds, so that the participation rate
of high-intensity and low-intensity groups in the political process is more
equal?7 ' What rights of access should the public be given to government information? What additional forms of assistance should be given to citizens to
facilitate participation in legislative and regulatory decision-making? The
potential impact of something as seemingly trivial as the broadcasting and
televising of parts of the Parliamentary process, so that information costs to
the public about public decision-making are reduced, also requires assessment.
The costs of over-regulation and under-government have been eloquently
articulated in a recent speech by Lewis Engman:
Though most government regulation was enacted under the guise of protecting the
consumer from abuse, much of today's regulatory machinery does little more
than shelter producers from the normal competitive consequences of lassitude
and inefficiency . ..

. The consumer for whatever presumed abuse he is being

spared is paying plenty in the form of government sanctioned price fixing. 72

Engman proceeds to give a number of examples from the regulated industries
of state-sanctioned monopoly profits, and estimates that in the transportation

field alone hidden regulatory subsidies may cost consumers in excess of $16
MoCf. G. Tullock, Public Decisions as Public Goods (1971), 70 J. Pol. Ec. 913.
As to the difficulties faced by courts making rational decisions in this area without
the relevant economic data before them, see the observations of Laskin, J. in A. G. for
Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg & Poultry Association (1971), 19 D.L.R. (3rd) 169 at 181,
182.
71 Cf. Election Expenses Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 51; Election Finances Reform Act,
S.O. 1975, c. 12. Both Acts require disclosure of contributions and limit permissible
expenses to a proportionate amount based on the number of registered electors in a
constituency. Only the Ontario legislation (s.19(1)), actually limits contributions by
any person or corporation to a cumulative maximum of $6,500.
72 Speech to Fall Conference of the Financial Analysts Federation, Detroit, October
7, 1974.
70
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billion a year ($80 per annum per man, woman and child in the U.S.).7' He
continues:
To me, the most distressing development is the pervasive and well-accepted
dishonesty that pervades the government's approach to regulation. The existing
crazy quilt of anti-consumer subsidies embodied in the intricately woven fabric
of federal and state statutes and regulations is pernicious because: (1) the
subsidies are deliberately hidden from public view; (2) the74 government had
(3) in most, if
irresponsibly lost track of the actual cost of these subsidies;
not all cases, we have adopted the least efficient form of subsidy with the purpose
of hiding the subsidy from the public and obfuscating its true cost .... 75
From time to time, proposals have been made to provide direct cash subsidies in
lieu of the patchwork of regulatory subsidies that now pervade our economy.
Opponents rise indignantly to object that hardworking individuals and businesses
do not want handouts. Well, a rose by any other name . . . Our airlines, our
trackers, our railroads, our electronics media and countless others are on the
dole. We get irate about welfare fraud. But, our complex systems of hidden regulatory subsidies make welfare fraud look like petty larceny .... The fact of the
matter is that most regulated industries have become federal protectorates, living
in the cozy world of cost-plus, safely protected from the ugly spectres of competition, efficiency and innovation.

Engman concludes that unless the whole regulatory apparatus can be radically
rationalised, "our regulators will continue to stumble around in an increasingly
expensive game of blind man's bluff".
His remarks are equally applicable to the Canadian regulatory scene.
Apart from the regulated industries, which in many cases are effectively
administering their own markets with the complicity of the State, other
occupations have won the right from the State explicitly to administer their
73
Canadians are estimated to spend one dollar in five on transportation costs, how
much on subsidies nobody knows.
74 A typical Canadian example of this kind of "dysfunction" is the current prosecution (the second in recent years) of sugar refiners for price-fixing by the Department of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs, while the Department of Finance insists on maintaining a customs tariff on imported, refined sugar.
75
Recent notable examples of this last point in Canada are the egg marketing
boards, where, in the alleged interest of the marginal farmer, a producer-determined
subsidy is levied on all consumers of eggs indiscriminately, whether they can afford
it or not (i.e. a regressive tax) and distributed to all producers indiscriminately, whether
they need it or not. This produces bizarre wealth redistribution effects, and is also inconsistent with the Federal Government's declared intention of bringing down food
prices by increasing supply rather than through controls, as witness the destruction in
the summer of 1974 of 28 million eggs by the central egg marketing agency (CEMA).
If an income transfer to marginal family farmers is thought socially desirable, why not
a direct selective, transfer through the progressive income tax system? If the problem is
also fluctuating farm incomes, why not better tax averaging provisions?
Another example concerns airlines regulation whereby in order to receive a profitable route, an airline has to agree to fly some unprofitable routes. This creates irrational
cross-subsidy effects between passengers on high-traffic routes and those on low-traffic
routes. Why not let all regional, national and international carriers compete on all routes
as they please and if some are abandoned as uneconomic, let the government let out to
competitive tender the right to fly these routes in return for a direct cash subsidy paid out
of general revenues? We would have more competition, and in the case of subsidized
routes, we would know, and decide, who is to pay what to whom (cf. address by J. W.
Pickersgill to the Air Transport Association of Canada, Vancouver, Oct. 30, 1974).
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own markets. For example, in Schedule I to the Quebec Professional Code,7 6
38 professions are listed, including social workers, agronomists, denturologists,
industrial relations counsellors, vocational guidance counsellors, and town
planners, all of whom are given some degree of monopoly power by the
State. The medical profession has, of course, been given a State-sanctioned
right to administer its own market with the helpful adjunct of being able
to make its own subventions out of public revenues. Proving that Statesanctioned monopolies are contagiously attractive, most parts of the agricultural sector, drawing expressly on the precedent of "professional" marketing
boards, have either received or are demanding the right to create producercontrolled agricultural marketing boards with comprehensive supply management powers. Add to this the emergence of international supply and price
management cartels in oil, sugar, coffee and other staples, beyond the reach,
of course, of domestic anti-trust laws, and the economic order in the world
seems bent on a retreat from nineteenth century laissez-faire capitalism to
thirteenth century feudalism, back from contract to status. Business (with the
aid of government) has now emerged as the chief subverter of the competitive
economy which it claims to remember so fondly.
It is submitted that the general form of the antidote to be urged by
consumerism that emerges from the foregoing analysis is this: As a first
priority, we should preserve or re-activate vigorously competitive markets
wherever possible and not succumb to producer pleas to spbstitute accommodating regulatory regimes.7 7 As a second best solution, in the event of
demonstrated and significant market failure, or in the event of undesirable
social outputs from admittedly competitive markets, we should invoke central
planning instruments such as competition, tariff and tax policies or legislated
direct subsidies, through a more publicly accountable central political process.
On the level of more specific and limited legislative programmes that significant
market imperfections might elicit, a substantial consumer consensus might be
found for stronger laws sanctioning misleading advertising and sales practices
so as to reduce the amount of misinformation given to consumers, disclosure
requirements (for example, true interest rates, informative labelling, unit
pricing), public product and service grading, public price comparisons, and
business complaints rating services, whenever the potential benefits to consumers from possessing this information exceed the costs of providing it.
Expanded consumer education programmes, and, very importantly, vastly
improved access to effective civil grievance-solving mechanisms might also
attract similar consumer support. These programmes would focus on the
complementary concepts of feeding better information into the market-place
and elevating the importance of civil enforcement mechanisms over criminal
and administrative enforcement mechanisms thus seeking to squeeze as much
non-competitive slack as possible out of the market. These twin approaches
would try to ensure that consumers have instruments placed at their disposal
which make them the principal agents in their own protection, and reduce
70

Bill 250, July 6, 1973, S.Q.
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Cf. A. Phillips, ed., Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets (Washington,

Brookings Institution, 1975).
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their dependence on public regulatory responses. Only as a third best solution,
where delegation of regulatory authority is unavoidable, should delegated
regulatory agencies be utilized, provided, however, that they are much more
publicly accessible and politically accountable than at present. In some situations, of course, a mix of all three approaches may be dictated but even here
we should not lose sight of where, presumptively, the relative policy emphases
should lie.
D.

CONCLUSION

This article has sought to identify some of the larger issues in the modem
regulatory state that consumerism must constantly confront, if in Heilbroner's
words, it is to claim a role as one of "the sentries of society" 78 For consumerism, in the last analysis, is about the fundamentals of our economic
system. To eschew this role can only mean that consumerism will become part
of the flotsam and jetsam of the modem regulatory state, adrift in a fathomless sea of regulatory dross, carried wherever the dictates of the tides and
winds of the moment decree.
To come full circle to the opening political analysis of this article, two
specific challenges now face modem consumerism. First, recognizing the diffusion of the consumer interest and the free rider problem, can the consumer
movement overcome the organizational, and thus political, disabilities that
afflict large, latent interest groups? Secondly, as the consumer movement seeks
to mobilize substantial political support, is it at the same time possible for it
to play the role of a fearless and far-sighted social critic by forging a broadbased coalition of citizens around a set of collective goals that embrace new
and relevant concepts of economic justice? Or will the consumer interest
always be too fragmented to allow of such a coalition? Does Dr. Stigler's
prognosis express an eternal verity? As the analysis in this article has sought
to show, these are daunting challenges, but to leave them unanswered may
be also to have abdicated on many other seemingly more pressing questions
about the future of our existing economic order.
78

Supra, note 16.

